Sunday, March 15, 2015

Case Analysis Effectiveness for ASCI 638 Unmanned Aircraft Systems Human Factors

Case Analysis Effectiveness for ASCI 638 Unmanned Aircraft Systems Human Factors
            The case analysis project was effective in encouraging research on the topic of “Human Factors: Failure Causes (Poor Situational Awareness, and Visual Perception)”.  It allowed better understanding of current problems associated with the human factors within unmanned aerial systems (UAS).  This case analysis also brought to light specific issues currently researched pertaining to UAV pilot visual perception and poor situational awareness including how it affects current flight conditions. Although some many consider the statistical data associated with these issue low, the end effect of mishaps and loss of high dollar UAS makes this a creditable reason for much needed attention.  This research has solidified the echoes for additional training and understand of situational awareness and visual perception in order to mitigate current and future risks.
            The intent of this course was to broaden my knowledge of UAS whether it is from a space or earthly perspective.  UAS complex capabilities are adapted to meet military and commercial needs in many applications.  When operating these systems it known that the pilot and crew will not be collocated therefore both specialties suffer from these problem.  The intent of this research for me means that I would in some way help to provide substantial research aiding in the quest to understand how to mitigate poor perception and poor situational awareness.

            The use of peer review to give the writer an outside perspective prove to be very useful if the reviewer truly gives constructive criticism that helps the researcher provide a better product.  I agree prior students who suggested, “For future instruction, an overview of the case analysis process and what defines a case analysis would be helpful prior to students conducting the actual case analysis.  This would give students a better idea of how to proceed and not” (Kipling, 2007).  The goal is to develop skills that will have long and lasting effect.  

Unmanned Aerial Systems: War, Morally Right?

Unmanned Aerial Systems: War, Morally Right?
            According Linda Johansson, the use of UAS are now the interpretative facts for the Laws of War, or LOW.  The premise presented is that although UAS offer a much need advantage namely reduction of loss of life during the wartime efforts it can give those who decide the “go” factor a sense of war being a “risk-free-enterprise” lowing the threshold of war implementation (Johannsson, 2011).   This may be the case if the decision makers don’t understand the full scope of war itself, and also if the operators of the technology don’t grasp the impacts of operating a lethal machine.  It is highly doubted that this is the case.  The 114th United State House of Representatives currently has 80 military veterans (Military Veterans in the United States House of Representatives One Hundred Fourteenth Congress, 2015).  These veteran are also included in the decision to go to war.  One must believe the focus of loss of life when speaking of UAS is a high point, but not the only high point considered.  Against the idea that the individuals involved in war think it is a “risk-free-enterprise”; an article “Done Pilots Suffer PTSD Just Like Those in Combat” published by live science brings to light the effects of war are real even for those who sit inside ground control stations miles away from harm (Blaszczak-Boxe, 2014).  The distance does not shield UAS operators from post-traumatic stress disorder better known as PTSD.  4.3 percent of operators discovered, after an intensive research, suffered from a moderate to severe case of PTSD compared to deployed military personnel diagnosis of 10 to 18 percent.  Clinical psychologist Wayne Chappelle states. "I would say that, even though the percentage is small, it is still a very important number, and something that we would want to take seriously so that we make sure that the folks that are performing their job isn effectively screened for this condition and treated” (Blaszczak-Boxe, 2014).  But what does morality have to do with this information?
            The use of UAS will always be an ongoing debate until the end of time with no real end game, some would express rightfully so.  This discussion is ramping upon more so now than ever for many reasons.  Could it be that we have had a small taste of what this technology is doing in the field? Or is the ensuing conversation at hand about total automation of UAS; giving the technology the right to decide who lives or dies?  Fully autonomous UAS engagement, i.e. human exclusion is now being considered as part of end user designs situations (Johannsson, 2011).  “Experts on military technology claim that we will in the future see machines that can “hunt, identify, authenticate, and possibly kill a target—without a human in the decision loop” (Magnuson, 2007).  Unfortunately the word autonomous bears many definitions and the ability to being interchanged as needed to address one’s cause.  So, what does morality have to do with this information?
            Just as UAS and the uses of UAS have been around for decades; war has a history dating back to the beginning of time.  Some individuals would argue that any technology used during wartime was designed to take human life.  Thus, all technology used during wartime is “unethical since war is unethical in itself” (Johannsson, 2011).  What I have found to be interesting is that there is a premise for “ethical war” – servility in war? Interesting.  As strange as this may sound it is serious; so serious that from the 19th century forward LOW has been officially encoded in protocols like the Geneva Conventions, plus the Rule of Engagement (Johannsson, 2011).  These are better known as “The rules of Jus ad Bellum and Jus in Bello” (Orend, 2008). 
                        Jus ad Bellum (Orend, 2008):
        Just cause: the reason for going to war needs to be just and cannot therefore be solely for recapturing things taken or punishing people who have done wrong; innocent life must be in imminent danger and intervention must be to protect life. Examples: self-defense from external attack, punishment for a severe wrongdoing which remains uncorrected. This is the first and most important rule.
        Right intention: the state must intend to fight the war only for the sake of its just cause. Force may be used only in a truly just cause and solely for that purpose—correcting a suffered wrong is considered a right intention, while material gain or maintaining economies is not.
        Legitimate authority: war is only between states.
        Last resort: all peaceful and viable alternatives have been seriously tried and exhausted or are clearly not practical.
        Reasonable chance of success: a state’s resort to war must be considered to have a measurable impact on the situation.
        Proportionality: the anticipated benefits of waging war must be proportionate to its expected evils or harms. (Also known as the principle of macroproportionality to separate it from the Jus in Bello principle of proportionality).

                        Jus in Bello (Orend, 2008):
        Discrimination: only military targets and enemy combatants can be attacked.
        Proportionality/excess: an attack cannot be launched on a military objective, if the civilian damage would be excessive in relation to the military advantage—the value of an attack must be in proportion to what is gained.
        Necessity: the attack must be necessary (just war should be governed by the principle of minimum force). This principle is meant to limit excessive and unnecessary death and destruction.
        Weapons: all international laws on weapons prohibitions must be obeyed, such as chemical and biological weapons. Nuclear weapons are considered taboo
           
What does morality have to do with this information?

            When looking at the LOW a very strong point was introduced, the Law of War must be “morally plausible to large numbers of men and women; it must correspond to our sense of what is right.”(Walzer, 2006, p. 133).  Okay, but morality is in the eye of the beholder.  One person’s moral compass may swing different from another, this is more often than not.  All of the above information is relevant to morality when using UAS in war.  In my opinion the use of UAS in wartime is no more egregious than using F16s, PAC3 missions, tanks or any other form of artillery.  UAS are just another means to an end – it is a tool for use.  The morality falls upon the entities in disagreement.  However, I must speak on full autonomy in the since of taking human’s out of the loop.  If this is the direction UAS technology is headed, it would be egregious to mistake standalone technological decisions as an acceptable answer.  Humans should never be taken out of the loop for many reasons.  If this occurs, it is inevitable that this could cause a lowing the threshold of war due to human disconnect or lack of engagement.  One can lose sight of the effects of war.   What is meant by this is, if humans fail to feel and reason it is possible to care less about the act of war or starting war.
References
Blaszczak-Boxe, A. (2014, August). Drone Pilots Suffer PTSD Just Like Those in Combat. Live Science. Retrieved March 15, 2015, from http://www.livescience.com/47475-drone-operators-develop-ptsd.html
Johansson, L. (2011). Is it morally right to use unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) in war?   Philosophy & Technology, 24(3), 279-291. doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s13347-011-0033-8
Magnuson, S. (2007). Robo soldiers. National Defense (pp. 36–40). September 2007.
Military Veterans in the United States House of Representatives One Hundred Fourteenth           Congress. (2015, January 6). Retrieved March 15, 2015, from   https://veterans.house.gov/veterans-congress-114th-congress
Orend, B. (2008). War. In Edward N. Zalta (Ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of philosophy (fall            2008 Edition). URL= http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/entries/war/.
Walzer, M. (2006). Just and unjust wars. New York: The Perseus Books Group.

Thursday, March 12, 2015

Unmanned Aircraft System Crew Selection Scan Eagle and Ikhana (MQ-9 Reaper variant)

Unmanned Aircraft System Crew Selection

            Human error will forever be named in the top contributing factor responsible for a large amount of UAS accidents.  Because this is a true fact crew selection is a critical part of guaranteeing safety of flight.  The purpose of this paper is to select the appropriate crew members who possess the right qualification, certification, and training requirements to operate the ScanEagle and Ikhana UAS. 

Ikhana – General Atomics Predator B
            The Ikhana is a General Atomics MQ-9 Reaper variant whose name comes from the Native American Choctaw Indian dialect for Intelligence.  The NASA flown UAS is much larger than the Insitu ScanEagle aircraft.  Ikhana possess a length of 36 ft., and a wingspan of 66 ft.  The aircraft weighs in at almost 2.5 tons with a maximum take-off ability of 10,500 pounds.   This make this Reaper comparable to an F-15 manned aircraft in overall size.  The sheer size of this UAS is explanation enough to understand its complexity doesn’t allow for quick or easy dissemble or assembly like the ScanEagle.  The Ikhana can’t be catapulted from the Mark 6 launcher nor snagged by the Skyhook like the Scan Eagle.  This aircraft requires takeoff and landing like the standard manned aircraft.  It needs a ground crew to maneuver each flight phase utilizing line of sight (LOS) communications during operations.  Due to the aircraft’s intricate design and capability, a ground crew should require no less than two flight operators (for ground control stations (GCS) failures), and two crew members for execution of maintenance for conducting pre-flight checklists and on the spot diagnosis/repairs when needed. 
            After take-off the Ikhana offers many control options.  Normal control option used by the crew of the Ikhana is to yield to the Ground Control Station which can be located far away from the UAS’s operation.  The GCS should use at minimum two crew members.  The pilot would control the flight of the aircraft via SATCOM to achieve beyond line of sight, BLOS operations.  The second crew member would operate the Ikhana payload and sensor operations.  Landing the massive aircraft would return to ground control’s base operation.

Insitu ScanEagle

             The Insitu ScanEagle is an agile work horse with wings spanning 10.2 ft., a length of 5.6 ft. and weighs 48.5 lbs. (Insitu, n.d).  ScanEagle offers easy assembly and disassembly.  This can be accomplished by a single crew member and installed on the launcher for takeoff (Stilipec, 2013).   The ScanEagle is fortune to have the Skyhook as the apparatus used in landing or snaring.   Because of the no muss no fuss approach the system only requires a one man ground team (Stilipec, 2013).
            The one man approach is also sufficient during aircraft operations and payload control (Stilipec, 2013).  In similarity the ScanEagle can fly a lot like the Global Hawk system.  The flight is controlled primarily by way of mouse and keyboard through waypoint inputs (Stilipec, 2013).  A joystick controls the payload carrying dual electro-optical and medium wave infrared camera (Insitu, n.d.).  A second crew member man’s communications between the system and various air traffic control agencies.  This crew member also monitors the datalink which is normally a secure internet network used during tactical command and control for various agencies (Stilipec, 2013). 
  
Crew Selections
            The criteria for crew selection comes largely from the capabilities of the UAS and the operation/mission.  Highly qualified UAS pilot candidates should possess qualifications as outlined on a General Atomics Aeronautical Systems job posting as stated on LinkedIn (2015):
·         FAA Ratings such as FAA Private Pilot Certificate, FAA Instrument Rating, FAA Commercial Certificate, FAA Certified Flight Instructor, (CFI), FAA Certified Flight Instructor Instrument (CFII).
·         800 hours PIC with 500 Unmanned Aircraft hours in an OSGCS.
·         Graduate of DA or DES IO Course.
  • Familiarity with Army forms, records and publications as well as Contractor Flight and Ground Operations procedures and records (DCMA 8210).
          “UAV flights may not require the operator to meet the same medical standards necessary for the pilot of a manned aircraft performing the same flight activity as the UAV” (Connor, Cooke, Pedersen, Pringle, & Salas, 2006).  It was decided that said medical requirements are also need to be fulfilled by all crew members and pilots in this case as well.  To establish these criteria the aid of guidelines and requirements provided by the Federal Aviation Administration and Connor, Cooke, Pedersen, Pringle and Salas (2006) were used.  These criteria to be incorporated are captured in the table 1 below.
  
Table 1. Pilot Medical Certification Standards

References
Connor, O., Cooke, N.J., Pedersen, H.K., Pringle, H.L., & Salas, E. (2006). Human factors of      remotely operated vehicles. Oxford, UK: JAI Press, pp. 76-77.
Federal Aviation Administration. (2007, February). Unmanned aircraft pilot medical Certification requirements. Retrieved from http://fas.org/irp/program/collect/ua-pilot.pdf
McKinley, R. A., McIntire, L.K., & Funke, M.A. (2009, November). Operator selection for          unmanned aerial vehicle operators: A comparison of video game players and manned aircraft pilots. Air Force Research Laboratory. Wright-Patterson AFB, OH, USA. Retrieved from: http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a518309.pdf
Stilipec, J. (2013, October 16). Airboyd.  Boeing Insitu ScanEagle operations. [Video File].  Retrieved from: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6wSQSDi__-Q
United States Air Force. (2010, August 18). MQ-9 Reaper. USAF. Retrieved from http://www.af.mil/AboutUs/FactSheets/Display/tabid/224/Article/104470/mq-9-reaper.aspx
UAV Pilot - OSGCS Qualified/Non-Deployable. (2015, January 1). Retrieved March 13, 2015, from https://www.linkedin.com/jobs2/view/11313256
Williams, K. (2007, February 1). Unmanned Aircraft Pilot Medical Certification Requirements. Retrieved March 13, 2015, from http://fas.org/irp/program/collect/ua-pilot.pdf

Monday, March 2, 2015

Operational Risk Management of the SCAN EAGLE UAS                   

            According to Google, ORM or Operational Risk Management is defined as “continued cyclic process that incorporates risk assessment, risk decision making, and also the implementation of risk controls.  This results in mitigation, acceptance and/or risk avoidance” (Google, n.d.).  The military defines ORM as “the process of dealing with risk associated with military operations.  This includes risk assessment, risk decision making, and implementation of effective risk controls” (Fort Sill Marine Corps Artillery Detachment, 2008). 
            Terms that are often related to Operational Risk Management (Fort Sill Marine Corps Artillery Detachment, 2008):
·         Risk – The loss of something relative to severity and probability
·         Severity – What is the worst plausible consequence when dealing with a hazard?
·         Hazard – Situation in which the likelihood of bodily injury, death, mission degradation or damage could occur.
·         Probability – How likely will the hazard result in loss or accident?
·         Control – The way one would reduce or decrease the likelihood of occurrence, and/or severity.
·         Risk Assessment – the process of assessing the risks associated with a known or unknown hazard.

         The research assignment’s focus is to delve into the Operational Risk Management of the Scan Eagle System.  The ScanEagle is an autonomous unmanned aerial vehicle designed to be agile, undetectable, and persistent (Boeing's ScanEagle, 2006).  This system is a low cost aerial system capable of providing multiple facets of surveillance, and environmental monitoring by way of myriad of sensor suites.  Scan Eagle is capable of providing ISR for locating high-value targets, acting as a forward observer, weather monitoring, chemical and biological weapons detection through air analysis, border patrols of real-time images, or it can be used for wireless communications relay and targeting of ships at sea (McGarry, 2003).  Other missions range from aiding weather forecasting, providing imagery for geomagnetic and atmospheric surveys, resource mapping, search and rescue operations or Battle Damage Assessment (Becket, 2007).

Scan Eagle’s Specifications are shown in the table below:

Table 1.0 General Characteristics of Scan Eagle UAV


Preliminary Hazard List/Analysis
  Figure 2. An example of a Preliminary Hazards Assessment worksheet for the sUAS, ScanEagle.

            The card above will be used to evaluate potential hazards that have the ability to make the flight and operation of ScanEagle an unsafe operation.  The PHL/A is designed for ease of tracking by establishing a track number per hazard entry. This information can be used to create a history of hazardous items encountered and stored in a database for safety trending and analysis.  The associated hazards are listed on the check list above such as environments such as - Maritime/Jungle/Desert/Mountains/Tundra.  The PHL/A also provides the chance to capture the hazard’s probability and severity of the hazard per MIL-STD-882D/E.  Assessing the risk level is very important and can be captured as a numerical value as perscribed by the System Safety Specification - MIL-STD-882D/E.
            The Analysis portion of the Preliminary Hazard List/Analysis card is used to assess the initial risks, and identify mitigation actions available for the identified hazards.  The residual risk level  - RRL provides an assessmen of  the identified event, item, danger after the mitigation is in place.  This action will give greater visibility of the hazard  which would aid in training. Knowing the likelihood of the hazard will occur regardless of mitigating actions is very important allowing the operators to adjust actions and reactions accordingly during ScanEagle operations.
Operation Hazard List/Analysis

  Figure 3. An example of a Preliminary Hazards Assessment worksheet for the sUAS, ScanEagle.

            The OHL/A is used during ScanEagle’s flight (Barnhart, Hottman, Marshall, & Shappee, 2011).  This data offers further ability for safety of operations research and record keep for ScanEagle.  System improvements and inovative thinking come from historical data gather by operator and crew associated with the ScanEagle UAS.  The OHL/A can drive UAS design improvements for new variants.  
ScanEagle Risk Assessment 
ScanEagle  Risk Assessment
Date: 
Aircraft: ScanEagle
Serial #: 
UAS Crew/Station:
_______________/____________           _______________/____________
_______________/____________           _______________/____________
Mission Type
SUPPORT
TRAINING
PAYLOAD CHECK
EXPERIMENTAL
1
2
3
4
Hardware Changes
NO
YES
1
4
Software Changes/Calibration
NO
YES
1
4
Airspace of Operation
WIDE OPEN
MINIMAL HAZ
MODERATE HAZ
ABUNDANT HAZ
1
2
3
4
Operator Experience with this Aircraft
EXPERT
ADVANCED
INTERMEDIATE
NOVICE
1
2
3
4
Flight Time
DAY
NIGHT
1
4
Type of Flight
LOS
LOS/BLOS
BLOS
FPV
1
2
3
4
Visibility
> 10 MILES
6-9 MILES
2-5 MILES
< 2 MILES
1
2
3
4
Surface Winds
0-5 KTS
5-15 KTS
> 15 KTS
2
3
4
Forecast Winds
0-5 KTS
5-15 KTS
> 15 KTS
2
3
4
Weather Deteriorating
NO
YES
1
4
Other Airspace Activity
NO
YES
1
4
Established Lost Link Procedures
YES
NO
1
NO FLIGHT
GPS Satellites Acquired
ALL 3
2
1
NONE
1
2
3
4
Proper "home" Location Set
YES
NO
1
4
Potential For Tx/Rx Interference
NONE
SOME
MODERATE
SEVERE
1
2
NO FLIGHT
NO FLIGHT
Total
RISK LEVEL
18-27
28-36
37-45
45-56
LOW
MEDIUM
SERIOUS
HIGH
Aircraft Number: __________________       Aircraft Type:  _______________________
Flight Released By:  _____________________________  Date: ____________  Time: ____________
 Figure 4. ScanEagle Operational Risk Management worksheet.  This worksheet is borrowed/adapted from: Barnhart, R., Hottman, S., Marshall, D., & Shappee, E. (2011).Introduction to Unmanned Aircraft Systems. London: CRC Press. page 128.

 Table 2 Risk assessment matrix

The above Risk Assessment is also a part of the overall Operational Risk Management necessary to maintain the safe operation of the ScanEagle UAS.  The form above rates the level of risk to ScanEagle operations by attaching numerical representation.  Those numerical identifications relay the level of safety, the low the number the greater the safety of flight operations.  The Matrix above also represents how DoD agencies color code risk to convey their level of importance.

References

Barnhart, R., Hottman, S., Marshall, D., & Shappee, E. (2011). Introduction to Unmanned                       Aircraft Systems. London: CRC Press.
Boeing's ScanEagle. (2006). Wings of Gold, 31, 13-15. Retrieved from             http://search.proquest.com.ezproxy.libproxy.db.erau.edu/docview/199487728?accountid= 27203
McGarry, T. (2003). Spy in the Sky, Stanford Alumni. Retrieved February 25, 2015, from             https://alumni.stanford.edu/get/page/magazine/article/?article_id=37560