Sunday, January 25, 2015

Unmanned Aerial Systems Ground Control Stations - Human Factor Issue

The topic of choice is the RQ-4 Global Hawk Unmanned Aerial Systems and its Ground Control Stations.  The Global Hawk provides field command with near-real time images in high-resolution using synthetic aperture radar –SAR, and long-range electro-optical/infrared –EO/IR sensing.  It is capable of carrying out various recon missions for multiple type of operations.  The Global Hawk has a nautical range of over 14,000 miles with a duration of flight that exceeds 42 hours.  The UAS is operable world-wide through the use of satellite and line-of-sight communications (RQ-4 Global Hawk, n.d.).  The Global Hawk and its variants are considered as semi-autonomous due to its occasionally required cross-checks and commands using human interfaces. 
The current Ground Control Stations are the MCE – Mission Control Element and the LRE – Launch and Recovery Element.  These GCS are designed for mobility and be self-sufficient.  This means that each trailer can function in separate sites and provide the necessary control needed to ensure mission success.  The LRE and the MCE workstations are generally manned by at least a minimum of three personnel crew.   
The Mission Control Element is the Global Hawks ground control station for recon operations.  From within the Mission Control Element crews are able to direct the aircraft where the UAS should go and what the UAS should do once it reaches its location.  The MCE contains four computer based work stations that provided human interaction for mission planning, CCO – Command and Control Operations, Communications, and sensor data collections and data processing (RQ-4 Global Hawk, n.d.). 

The Launch and Recovery Element does just what it is says, controls the launch and recovery of the UAS.  The LRE is responsible for “precision differential global positioning system corrections” which provides the necessary accuracy during mission navigation for landing and take-off of the Global Hawk.  The LRE is also responsible for “coded GPS” which also incorporates an inertial navigational system for mission execution (RQ-4 Global Hawk, n.d). 
The MCE and LRE pilot workstations are designed with control and display interfaces similar to an aircraft cockpit.  These workstations displays UAS health status, and sensors status. The pilot can also alter the navigational course of the Global Hawk.  These workstations also include pilot communications capabilities with outside command team members allowing the coordination of any mission.  This would include team members such as air traffic control, airborne controllers, ground controllers, and additional Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance personnel of value (RQ-4 Global Hawk, 2014).  

The workstation designated for sensor operators furnishes the capability of assigning the sensors and continuously updating numerous plans during real time operations.  This workstation is able to initiate the calibration of sensors, plus observe and check the progress; event the quality; of sensors through the mission (RQ-4 Global Hawk, 2014).   Additional responsibilities include sensor operator node exploitation with image quality control allowing the UAS ability to provide the best image possible (RQ-4 Global Hawk, 2014).  The sensor operator is also responsible for target decking prioritization and the tracking of scenes for fluid operations (RQ-4 Global Hawk, 2014).

Below are figures 1 through 4 which depict the RQ4 Global Hawk and its internal set-up of the MCE and the LRE.  These photo provided to supply a visual explanation of the confined close quartered, non-ergonomic arrangements for the UAS pilots which can lead to human factor issues during flight.

Figure 1.0 An RQ-4 Global Hawk gets prepared for a mission while deployed Nov. 23, 2010, at an air base in Southwest Asia. The RQ-4 and the Airmen are assigned to the 380th Expeditionary Operations Group.  Retrieved Jan. 25, 2015 from http://www.af.mil/AboutUs/FactSheets/Display/tabid/224/Article/104516/rq-4-global-hawk.aspx

Figure 2.0, GCS for the Global Hawk. Retrieved Jan. 25, 2015 from http://www.af.mil/AboutUs/FactSheets/Display/tabid/224/Article/104516/rq-4-global-hawk.aspx


Figure 3.0   GCS for the Global Hawk. Retrieved Jan. 25, 2015 from http://www.af.mil/AboutUs/FactSheets/Display/tabid/224/Article/104516/rq-4-global-hawk.aspx

Figure 4.0, GCS for the Global Hawk. Retrieved Jan. 25, 2015 from http://www.af.mil/AboutUs/FactSheets/Display/tabid/224/Article/104516/rq-4-global-hawk.aspx

The Global Hawk is capable of automation it still requires human interfacing for monitor the health and status of the aircraft, and information exchange between the sensor operators & between the UAS and the GCS. Although the Global Hawk “Hawk has no cockpit”, “It flies itself”, “has no joysticks, throttles, or pedals”, provide no “pilot's-eye view from the plane”, incorporates no “forward-facing camera” it still requires human interface (Schorr & Weed, 2002).   Yes, it is dubbed as the “first man-out-of-the-loop airplane” during flight but monitoring of missions are left in the hands of the two on-board computers (Schorr & Weed, 2002).   UAS operations that are long-endurance, such as the Global Hawk require shifting of work schedules to operate the Ground Control Station 24/7 causing fatigues (McCarley, & Wickens, 2005).  These prolong hours for UAS pilots lead to serious inferences on physical performances and mental stamina of UAS pilots.  Discussions have led to “identified automation as being central to many of the human factors issues that are of concern in the case of the Global Hawk UAV” (Burchat, Hopcroft, & Vince, 2006).  In addition the UAS operators voiced that they feel “it is difficult to monitor the automated system closely over extended periods” (Burchat, Hopcroft, & Vince, 2006).  In addition, Situational awareness and resolutions of fault and failures suffer resulting in pilots selectively monitoring certain cockpit instruments for system performance or being prepared for unexpected changes. 
Although the Global Hawk has an extremely low crash record this doesn’t mean that the pilots are able to totally rely upon the system.  No matter what the level of automation, when humans are involved human factors must be monitored and addressed for continued mission success.  One way to continue successful missions would be to continuously train increasing pilot understanding of the system, and possible systems failure scenarios cultivating the proper timely respond required for such a sophisticated technology.

  

Burchat, E., R. Hopcroft, & Vince, J.  (2006, May). Unmanned Aerial Vehicles for Maritime Patrol: Human Factors Issues. Retrieved January 25, 2015, from http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a454918.pdf

McCarley, J., & Wickens, C. (2005). Human factors implications of UAVs in the national airspace. Savoy, Ill:  University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, Aviation Human Factors Division. Retrieved January 25, 2015, from http://www.tc.faa.gov/logistics/Grants/pdf/2004/04-G-032.pdf

RQ-4 Global Hawk. (2014, October 27). Retrieved January 25, 2015, from http://www.af.mil/AboutUs/FactSheets/Display/tabid/224/Article/104516/rq-4-global-hawk.aspx
RQ-4 Global Hawk. (n.d.). Retrieved January 25, 2015, from http://air-attack.com/page/54/RQ-4-Global-Hawk.html

Schorr, C. & Weed, W. (2002, August 1). Flying Blind. Retrieved January 25, 2015, from http://discovermagazine.com/2002/aug/featflying


This blog will used for the purpose of fulfilling an ERAU requirement for the ASCI Human Factors in Unmanned Aerial Systems course. I am currently a student of the university seeking a Masters in Aeronautical Science.